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Abstract.We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition
with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters’ types. We as-
sume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians;
members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the
contrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities:
that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians
are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party mem-
bers is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politi-
cians have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties
to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which
professional politicians have much better information than the members of the
party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected
utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional
politicians choose.
1 Introduction
The traditional view in models of spatial political competition assumes that
parties are non-ideological organizations run by professional politicians who
try to maximize the probability of winning the election (see Downs [9]). Many
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recent papers, however, take a di¤erent position which supposes that political
competition is best described by ideological party competition (see for example
Wittman [17]; Calvert [5]; Alesina [1]; Roemer [15, 16]; Alesina and Rosenthal
[3, 2]; Ortuno-Ortı´n [12] and the survey in Osborne [13]). In this case parties
have preferences on the policy space and their goal is not to win the election
per se but to implement the best possible policy according to those preferences.
In models with non-ideological parties (Downsian models) the general re-
sult, for the two party case, is that at equilibrium the policy proposals con-
verge. Under the alternative approach of ideological parties, and assuming
uncertainty, the typical result is that the policy proposals do not converge (see
Roemer [15, 16].)
This problem of the objective function of parties is, in certain aspects,
parallel to the much studied question in economics of the objective of the firm.
We can see members and supporters of a party as the shareholders of a firm
and professional candidates or politicians as the managers. Managers’ goals
di¤er from those of the shareholders. One of the problems faced by share-
holders is how to control the actions taken by managers. It is common to as-
sume that managers have better information about some relevant economic
variables than shareholders. In our problem it will be assumed that profes-
sional politicians have better information about the electorate than the general
members of the party.
In this paper we consider a very simple model of political competition with
two parties which can be run either by the members or by professional politi-
cians. We will identify the members with the party and the professional poli-
ticians with the candidate. Parties will have well defined preferences on the
set of feasible policies. Candidates, on the contrary, only care about winning
the election and they may have better information than the parties about the
(uncertain) distribution of voters.
Two main scenarios will be analyzed: i) The two parties directly compete
between themselves and candidates don’t play any role. This would be the
case in which, for example, the party general assembly determines the political
platform and the candidate is a perfect agent of the party1. ii) In the second
scenario we consider the ‘‘Downsian’’ case in which competition takes place
between the candidates. Candidates don’t care about the policy that is enacted,
they just want to win the election. Here party members will have no influence
on the political proposals2.
Our objective is to compare the ex-ante expected utility (i.e., the expected
utility before the outcome of the election is known) that parties will get under
these two cases. The results will depend on the extent of asymmetry of infor-
1 A party is formed by many members with possibly di¤erent preferences. We assume,
however, that they have already solved their preference aggregation problem so that
the party has well defined preferences. These preferences could coincide, for example,
with the preferences of the median member of the party or the median constituency.
2 Section 4 provides some comments on a more realistic scenario in which candidates
can still choose the political platforms, as in ii). Parties, however, are able to impose
some bounds on the set of policy platforms that candidates can adopt.
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mation between candidates and parties. In the case in which such an asym-
metry does not exist, so that candidates and parties have the same information
about the (uncertain) distribution of voters’ preferences, we show that both
parties are, ex-ante, better o¤ if candidates run the party, i.e., they are better
o¤ in case ii) than in cases i). The intuition is simple. If parties compete among
themselves and there is uncertainty about the distribution of voters, at equi-
librium there is no convergence and, therefore, the outcome is a lottery.
Sometimes the outcome is a ‘‘leftist’’ policy and sometimes is a ‘‘conservative’’
policy. In the case of candidate competition, on the contrary, there is always
convergence to the expected median voter ideal policy which is a ‘‘moderate’’
policy. If parties are risk-averse this moderate policy is preferred by both
parties to the expected outcome under direct party competition. Thus, our
result will show not only that the outcome in case ii) is less extreme than the
outcome in i), but also that both ideological parties are better o¤ under ii)
than under i). However, when candidates have much better information than
parties about the distribution of voters’ preferences this insurance e¤ect may
disappear. Namely, we will show that in case ii) the expected utility for parties
is decreasing in the ‘‘amount’’ of information candidates have about the dis-
tribution of voters.
If we accept the view that in most advanced democracies professional poli-
ticians and the general population share the same basic information about the
distribution of voters,3 then our results suggest that competition between pro-
fessional politicians, who only want to be in o‰ce, may be an e‰cient way to
insure parties (and voters) against ‘‘radical’’ changes in policy.
2 The basic model
In this and the next sections we model political competition as a game played
by the two parties. Candidates play no role here and will only be introduced
in Sect. 4. Parties have well defined utility functions on the space of feasible
policies.
Let R be the set of agents’ types. Agent of type o A R has von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function uð: ;oÞ : R ! R, where u is a concave function
and o is the ideal point of type o, i.e., o is such that uðo;oÞ > uðx;oÞ for all
x0o. We assume that uðx;oÞ is symmetric about o, that is, for all x A R we
have uðo x;oÞ ¼ uðoþ x;oÞ4. To make some proofs simpler we also as-
sume that uð:Þ is twice continuously di¤erentiable.
3 For example, the most prestigious opinion polls are always published in the general
press. This, however, doesn’t always imply that the general population and professional
politicians share the same relevant information about the distribution of voters. The
opinions that matter are opinions on policy and most of the polls published in the gen
eral press don’t provide information on this.
4 Under symmetric preferences, an agent always votes for the proposal closest to her
ideal policy. This assumption makes the whole analysis simpler and more transparent.
Eaton and Lipsey [10], Denzau et al. [8], Cox [7], for example, also consider these pref
erences.
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The two parties are denoted by L and R. Party LðRÞ has utility function
uL : R ! R ðuR : R ! RÞ that coincides with the utility function of agent of
type o ¼ 0 ðo ¼ 1Þ, i.e., uLðxÞ ¼ uðx; 0Þ for all x A R ðuRðxÞ ¼ uðx; 1Þ for all
x A RÞ. The political game is such that each party announces (simultaneously)
a policy which must be an element of R. Each agent votes for the party that
announced the policy which gives a higher utility according to her utility func-
tion. Let l A R ðr A RÞ be the policy announced by party LðRÞ. Given the pair
of proposals ðl; rÞ, the agent of type o votes for LðRÞ if uðl;oÞ > uðr;oÞ (if
uðl;oÞ < uðr;oÞ). If uðl;oÞ ¼ uðr;oÞ she votes for party L with probability
1/2.5 It is not di‰cult to show that, given ðl; rÞ, the agent of type odðl; rÞ :¼ lþr2
is indi¤erent between l and r and all agents with type o<odðl; rÞ ðo>odðl; rÞÞ
will vote for party LðRÞ. The existence of this ‘‘dividing’’ type odðl; rÞ will
simplify some of the proofs. If l0 r party LðRÞ will win the election whenever
odðl; rÞ is greater (less) than the median type. In the case both parties announce
the same policy, i.e. l ¼ r ¼ odðl; rÞ, party L wins with probability 0.5. Note
that parties need information only about the location of the type containing
the median voter.
We suppose that parties are uncertain about the distribution of voters’ types
(see Roemer [15, 16]; Wittman [17, 18]; Hansson and Stuart [11]). Namely,
parties are uncertain about the median type. They believe that the median type
is a random variable distributed according to the density function f : R ! Rþ.
This function is unimodal and symmetric with respect to the point 1/2 and
therefore f attains its maximum at 1/2.
Assumption 1. The density function f is unimodal and satisfies
1. f ðxÞ ¼ 0 if x B ½0; 1
2. f

1
2 k
¼ f 12þ k for all k A 0; 12
The expected median type is 0.5. Parties are ‘‘located’’ around such an
expected value. The actual median type, however, can deviate in one direction
or the other from 0.5. We assume that such deviations are equally probable in
either direction. Moreover, the ideal policy of the median voter is always in
between the ideal policy of party R and the ideal policy of party L. Hence the
ideal policy of the median voter will be an element in the set W ¼ ½0; 1.6 We
will denote by F the cumulative density function of f .
Let pðl; rÞ be the probability that party L wins. If l ¼ r we have pðl; rÞ ¼ 12.
If l < r we have that pðl; rÞ is the probability that the dividing type odðl; rÞ is
greater than the median type, i.e. pðl; rÞ ¼ F ðodðl; rÞÞ.
3 The party equilibrium
In this section we analyze the equilibrium of the game played by the two parties
when candidates have no influence on the choice of strategies. If party L and
5 The set of agents that are indi¤erent between two policies has measure zero.
6 This restriction is imposed for simplicity and our results also hold for the more gen
eral case in which the support of f is the interval ½0:5 M; 0:5þM, M > 0.
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party R propose l and r, l a r, respectively, the expected utilities of parties are
given by
vLðl; rÞ1 pðl; rÞuLðlÞ þ ð1 pðl; rÞÞuLðrÞ ð1Þ
vRðl; rÞ1 pðl; rÞuRðlÞ þ ð1 pðl; rÞÞuRðrÞ ð2Þ
A Party Equilibrium (PE) is a pair of proposals ðl p; rpÞ which is a Nash
equilibrium of the game played by the parties with the payo¤ functions given
by (1) and (2).
The next assumption will be used to establish the existence of a PE.
Assumption 2. (Log-concavity of F and 1 F). The ratio f ðxÞ
FðxÞ is non increasing
and the ratio
f ðxÞ
1 FðxÞ is non decreasing in x.7
We say that a Party Equilibrium ðl p; rpÞ is symmetric if l p ¼ 1 rp. The
following lemma shows the existence of a unique symmetric Party Equilib-
rium.8
Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists a unique symmetric
Party Equilibrium, ðl p; rpÞ. Furthermore, l p < rp.
All the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
We will denote by vL ðvRÞ the expected utility for party LðRÞ in the Party
Equilibrium, i.e., vL ¼ vLðl p; rpÞ and vR ¼ vRðl p; rpÞ.
4 Competition with Downsian candidates
We now assume that both parties are run by professional politicians which we
call candidates. To make things simpler it is assumed that each party is run by
a unique candidate. Candidates are not ideological, that is, they do not have
preferences on the political issues. Their objective is to maximize the proba-
bility of winning the election.
In this section we analyze the special case in which parties have no means
to control the policy adopted by the candidates. Our task will be to compare
7 This assumption is weaker than concavity of log f (see Barlow and Proschan [4]), i.e.,
if f is log concave then F is log concave, but log concavity of F does not imply log
concavity of f . Most commonly used density functions are log concave and therefore
satisfy our assumption. Concavity of log f implies unimodality but concavity of logF
does not. Thus the unimodality condition stated in Assumption 1 is not superfluous.
See Caplin and Nalebu¤ [6] for a list of the class of log concave densities and Pratt [14]
for examples of distribution functions for which logF and logð1 FÞ are concave but
log f is not.
8 Unless we impose further restrictions we cannot rule out the existence of additional
non symmetric equilibria. In Roemer [16], existence of equilibrium is proven under a
joint condition on the utility function of the voters and on F which is stronger than our
Assumption 2. The reason why we need a weaker condition is that here the ‘‘dividing’’
type is given by lþr2 and there the dividing type is given by a di¤erent function which
depends on the curvature of the agents’ utility functions.
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the expected utility of parties under the equilibrium obtained in the previous
section with their expected utility if candidates run the parties.
We want to model the idea that candidates may have better information
than parties about the distribution of the median voter. This better informa-
tion will be described by a (measurable) partition P of W ¼ ½0; 1. Thus, if
candidates have the ‘‘information partition’’ P and x is the true median type,
candidates know that the true median type is in the event in P which contains
x. We will denote by Pp the information partition of the parties. This partition
is such that Pp ¼ fWg. Thus parties only know that the median type is in the
set W and that it is distributed according to the cumulative distribution func-
tion F. Candidates may have an information partition P di¤erent from Pp. We
will also be interested in what happens when the information held by candi-
dates ‘‘improves’’. Improvements in information will be represented by finer
partitions of W.
More formally, let Pn, n ¼ 1; 2; 3 . . . ; be the partition of W formed by 2n 1
intervals such that
Pn ¼ f½an0 ; an1 Þ; ½an1 ; an2 Þ; . . . ; ½an2 n 1 1; an2 n 1 g
where an0 ¼ 0, an2n 1 ¼ 1, and ani < aniþ1.
We also write the ith element of Pn as I
n
i so that Pn ¼ fI n1 ; I n2 ; . . . ; I n2 n 1g.
Given the partition Pn, and in order to simplify the notation, we write oðiÞ1
2n 1  i þ 1.
Assumption 3. i) For all n and for all i we have
I ni ¼ I nþ12i 1W I nþ12i
ii) For all n > 1 and for all ia 12 2
n 1 we have that the interval I ni ¼ ½ani 1; ani Þ
and the interval I noðiÞ ¼ ½anoðiÞ 1; anoðiÞÞ are symmetric around point 12, i.e.
anoðiÞ ¼ 1 ani 1 and anoðiÞ 1 ¼ 1 ani
The first part of the assumption says that if n 0 > n then Pn 0 is a finer par-
tition than Pn. Thus, partition Pn 0 provides a better information about the dis-
tribution of the median voter than the information provided by partition Pn.
The second part of the assumption states that an information partition can
have no bias towards one of the ‘‘sides’’, i.e. each element of the partition
lying on the left hand side of 12 has its identical counterpart on the right
hand side of 12.
If candidates have information partition P1, they have the same informa-
tion as parties (that is, Pp ¼ P1 ¼ fWg). We will denote by Py the full infor-
mation case, that is, the case in which candidates know the true value of the
median type.
Candidates, as well as parties, know that the prior distribution for the
median type is given by the cumulative density function F with density function
f . However, they also have the information partition Pn. Before announcing
their policies both candidates observe a signal snj , j A f1; 2; . . . 2n 1g the same
signal for both candidates that indicates the element I nj of the partition Pn in
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which the true median type lies. After observing this signal candidates update
the prior to obtain the posterior density function f ðxjI nj Þ. This posterior is cal-
culated by Bayes’ rule, that is
f ðxjI nj Þ ¼
f ðxÞÐ
I n
j
f ðyÞ dy for all x A I
n
j
0 otherwise
8<
:
We write the cumulative density function associated with f ð:jI nj Þ as F ð:jI nj Þ.
We also write the median of Fð:jI nj Þ as mnj , i.e., Fðmnj jI nj Þ ¼ 12.
The idea is that before receiving the signal candidates have the same infor-
mation as parties (this information is captured by the prior f .) Candidates,
however, have the advantage of being able to observe a signal which provides
more information about the value of the median type.
The political game is such that, after observing signal snj , each candidate
announces (simultaneously) a policy. Each agent in a similar way to our as-
sumption in the previous section votes for the candidate that announced the
policy that gives higher utility according to her utility function. Let a A R
ðb A RÞ be the policy announced by candidate of party LðRÞ. As in the previ-
ous sections we write the ‘‘dividing’’ type as odða; bÞ ¼ aþb2 . Let PLða; b; I nj ÞðPRða; b; I nj ÞÞ be the probability of winning for the candidate of party LðRÞ
when the information partition is Pn, the signal is s
n
j and the announced poli-
cies are ða; bÞ, that is, for a0 b
PLða; b; I nj Þ ¼ F
aþ b
2
j I nj
	 

ð3Þ
PRða; b; I nj Þ ¼ 1 F
aþ b
2
j I nj
	 

ð4Þ
and for a ¼ b, PLða; b; I nj Þ ¼ PRða; b; I nj Þ ¼ 12.
A Candidate Equilibrium for the information partition Pn and the signal s
n
j is
a pair of proposals ða; bÞ which is a Nash equilibrium of the game played by
the candidates with the payo¤ functions given by (3) and (4).
The following lemma states that the proposals of the candidates converge
to the median value of the ideal policy of the median voter. Thus, this is a kind
of ‘‘median voter theorem’’ with uncertainty.
Lemma 2. Let candidates have information partition Pn and observe signal s
n
j .
Then, the unique Candidate Equilibrium is given by a ¼ b ¼ mnj .
Notice that for partition P1 the candidate equilibrium is such that a
 ¼
b ¼ 12. Our goal now is to analyze the expected utility of parties when candi-
dates play the political game. It is assumed that parties know Pn, the infor-
mation partition of the candidates. What parties don’t know is the signal
observed by candidates. They, however, associate probabilities to each possi-
ble signal. Given information partition Pn parties believe that candidates will
observe signal snj with probability e
n
j 1
Ð
I n
j
f ðxÞ dx. Thus, the probability enj is
consistent with the prior f . Parties also know that if candidates observe signal
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snj they will adopt the policy given by the corresponding candidate equilibrium.
Thus, the expected utility for parties when candidates play the political game
and have information partition Pn is given by
vcLðnÞ1
X2 n 1
j¼1
enj uLðmnj Þ ð5Þ
vcRðnÞ1
X2 n 1
j¼1
enj uRðmnj Þ ð6Þ
Next we compare the expected utility of parties under the Candidate Equi-
librium with the utility they get under the Party Equilibrium obtained in
Sect. 3. This comparison clearly depends on the specific information partition
that candidates have, that is, it depends on how much information advantage
candidates have. Recall that vi is the utility party i gets under the Party
Equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We have: i) If parties and candi-
dates share the same information the expected utility, for both parties, under
the Candidate Equilibrium is greater than the expected utility under the Party
Equilibrium. ii) In the case candidates have better information than the parties,
the expected utility parties get from the Candidate Equilibrium decreases as
the informational advantage of candidates over parties increases. Formally for
i ¼ L;R
i) vi < v
c
i ð1Þ;
ii) vci ðnÞ; is decreasing in n;
The theorem shows that if candidates have no information advantage then
both parties are better o¤ under the Candidate Equilibrium than under the
Party Equilibrium. In the Party Equilibrium, proposals don’t converge and,
as a consequence, both parties get involved in a lottery. Under the Candidate
Equilibrium, on the contrary, proposals converge. Thus, candidates can be
seen as a device to lower the risk that would be created by direct competition
of the two ideological parties. However, it is important to emphasize that this
result does not imply that the members of a party prefer that it be run by a
candidate who is interested only in winning. In fact, a party is not better o¤
if unilaterally lets its candidate choose the policy proposal9. Thus, the theorem
only analyzes the welfare implications of two exogenously given political com-
petition settings. One might consider a richer model than the one developed
9 Say that only party L delegates policy selection to its candidate. In this case, party R
would propose policy r ¼ 1 (its ideal policy) and the candidate of L wants to propose a
policy l < 1 ‘‘as close as possible’’ to 1. Thus, candidate L’s best reply is not well defined.
However, this is just a technical problem and we can assume that the candidate of party
L would propose a policy that only slightly di¤ers from r. It is clear that here the ex
pected utility for party L is less than under the Party Competition equilibrium.
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in this paper in which these settings are endogenous. For instance, consider a
two-period game in which in the first period parties choose (simultaneously)
whether or not to ‘‘delegate’’ on candidates. In the second period either the
party or the candidate, depending on the first period choice, chooses policy
and the election takes places. It is not di‰cult to see that under some technical
additional assumptions10 the unique (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium of
this game implies no delegation and, as a consequence, the payo¤ outcome
coincides with the utilities obtained under the Party Equilibrium of our model.
Thus, the parties’ decisions to delegate policy selection to the candidates is a
sort of prisoners’ dilemma.
The second part of the theorem states that the expected utility parties get
from the Candidate Equilibrium decreases as the informational advantage of
candidates over parties increases. To get an intuition for this result think, for
example, of the full information case Py: parties know that the Candidate
Equilibrium coincides with the true median type which can be any policy in
½0; 1 (with density function f ). Thus, letting candidates play the political game
might not be an ‘‘insurance device’’ any more. Even tough in general we can-
not compare vci ðyÞ and vi one can easily provide examples in which vci ðyÞa vi
for i ¼ L;R. In this case, both parties are better o¤ if they, instead of the can-
didates, choose the proposals11.
One may argue that our findings depend crucially on the symmetry assump-
tions. It is important, then, to clarify the role symmetry plays in our model.
Let’s concentrate in Assumption 1 which imposes symmetry on the distribution
of the median voter12. It is true that without symmetry of f no general result
can be obtained. More precisely, one can easily find examples with asym-
metric density function f for which statement i) in the theorem doesn’t hold,
i.e. one party is better o¤ in the Party Equilibrium than in the Candidate
Equilibrium. This, however, doesn’t mean that our results are not robust to
changes in our assumption on f (as long as the changes are not too big).
Notice that the inequality in Theorem 3 (i) is strict, so that by continuity one
could relax symmetry a little bit. A numerical example can be useful to illus-
trate these issues. Let’s consider the utility function uðx;oÞ1ðw xÞ2 and
10 These assumptions are needed to overcome the problem of existence of equilibrium
if one party is run by a candidate and the other is not (see previous footnote.)
11 In the case of competition with Downsian candidates we have supposed that can
didates are free to choose the political proposals. A more realistic approach might con
sider possible restrictions on candidates’ choices. Parties may be able to impose some
bounds on the set of policies candidates can adopt. One can show, however, that the
equilibrium in this case coincides with the one in which parties compete between them
selves.
12 We consider that symmetry on the function f is the most critical assumption in our
model. Notice that allowing for asymmetric density functions on the distribution of the
median voter it is very similar to getting rid of the symmetry assumption on the loca
tion of parties’ ideal policy keeping the distribution of the median voter symmetric. On
the other hand, symmetry on the utility of voters (and parties) it is a very common
assumption on the literature and it should be seen as less problematic than symmetry
of f .
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suppose that the value of the median voter is distributed according to the
Betaða; bÞ distribution. We set the parameter a ¼ 2. Notice that such distri-
bution with b ¼ 2 yields a symmetric density function around 12, and the
greater the value of the parameter b the more concentrated the mass is near
0. We compute the Political Equilibrium and the Candidate Equilibrium for
di¤erent values of b ranging from b ¼ 2 up to b ¼ 8. Figure 1 shows the
Beta density function for b ¼ 2; 5; 8. For party L the expected utility under
the Candidate Equilibrium is always higher than the expected utility under the
Party Equilibrium. For party R the expected utility under the Candidate
Equilibrium is higher than the expected utility under the Party Equilibrium
only for values of b lower than (approximately) 5. Thus, when the parameter b
is greater than 5 the result provided in the theorem does not hold. Notice,
however, that such distributions are highly asymmetric suggesting that our
result remains valid in most realistic cases. In other words, our result is not
longer valid for cases in which the median voter is, with a very high proba-
bility, very close to the ideal policy of a party and very far away from the ideal
policy of the other party.
One might also wonder about the consequences of relaxing, simoulta-
neously, our three symmetry assumptions. Thus, consider the case where the
ideal policy for party L is greater than zero, the utility function is asymmetric
and the density function is skewed. By the same argument given above that
the inequality in Theorem 3 (i) is strict small relaxations of the symmetry
assumptions are compatible with our results. A second numerical example can
be useful here. Let the utility function be given by uðx;oÞ1aðw xÞ2 if
x < o and uðx;oÞ1ð1 aÞðw xÞ2 if xbo. The parameter a measures
the degree of assymetry of the utility function (when a ¼ 0:5 we have the sym-
metric case analyzed in the paper). Let the ideal policy for party L be oL ¼ 0:1,
and let the value of the median voter be distributed according to the Beta dis-
tribution with parameters a ¼ 2 and b ¼ 2:5. Let’s make a ¼ 0:55. Thus, the
utility functions, the ideal policies and the density function are not longer sym-
metric. However, it is not di‰cult to show that the inequality in Theorem 3 (i)
Fig. 1.
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still holds. Moreover, one can also show, by means of simulations13, that such
inequality also holds for all values of oL in the interval ½0; 0:1, values of b
in ½2; 2:5 and values of a in ½0:5; 0:55. Thus, these examples illustrate that the
results are robust to small changes of the symmetry assumption.
5 Final comments
The results provided in our model highlight the possibility that professional
politicians (the candidates) play an ‘‘insurance’’ role in the competition among
political parties. This is more likely to happen when members of the party
have the same information as candidates about the value of the median voter
type. This possible insurance e¤ect doesn’t preclude, obviously, that ex-post,
i.e. after the election, the party can be dissatisfied with the policy chosen by the
candidate.
Two important remarks have to be made: i) We have compared the situa-
tion in which both parties choose policy versus the situation in which both
candidates choose policy. One may think that who chooses policy is also part
of the strategy of parties, that is, to delegate or not to delegate the power to
the candidates may be seen as part of the political competition between parties.
In this case, the party might design ‘‘incentive schemes’’ for the candidates. An
analysis of these possibilities is left for future research. ii) One of the strong
assumptions in the model is that the ideal policy of the expected median voter
is located at the same distance from the ideal policy of party R and the ideal
policy of party L. Thus, parties are located symmetrically about the expected
median voter. We believe that this is a good first approximation. In a more
general model, however, one party, say L, may be closer to the expected median
than party R. In this case, the first part of the theorem doesn’t need to hold; it
might be the case that, for enough asymmetry in the location of parties, R is
better o¤ under the Party Equilibrium than under the Candidate Equilibrium
when parties and candidates have the same information. The reason would be
that even though the Candidate Equilibrium brings convergence in the pro-
posals, the expected value of the lottery induced by the Party Equilibrium is
much closer to R than the policy outcome under the Candidate Equilibrium.
A general analysis of this case is di‰cult since the Party Equilibrium would
depend strongly on the specific type of utility function adopted. The second
part of the theorem, however, would still hold: the better the information can-
didates have about the distribution of voters the lower the expected utility for
both parties.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. i) A necessary condition for ðl p; rpÞ to be a Political Equi-
librium is that rp is a solution to
13 All the simulations were done with Mathematica and are available from the author
upon request.
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max
r
vRðl p; rÞ ð7Þ
Since the median type is always an element of ½0; 1 we have that for any l A R
there exists r 0 A ½0; 1 such that vRðl; r 0Þ > vRðl; rÞ for all r B ½0; 1. A similar
argument applies for party L. Thus, without loss of generality, we can restrict
ourselves to proposals (strategies) in the interval ½0; 1. Recall that for r0 l
we have that uR and pðl; rÞ are di¤erentiable in r. Thus the function vRðl; rÞ is
di¤erentiable at all r A ðl; 1. Since vRðl; lÞ ¼ uRðlÞ we have
vRðl; rÞ > vRðl; lÞ for all r A ðl; 1 ð8Þ
Inequality (8) already shows that there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium
with l p ¼ rp.
The fact that u 0Rð1Þ ¼ 0 and inequality (8) imply that the solution to (7) is
an element r A ðl p; 1Þ which must satisfy the first order condition
0:5 f
l p þ r
2
	 

ðuRðl pÞ  uRðrÞÞ þ 1 F l
p þ r
2
	 
	 

u 0RðrÞ ¼ 0 ð9Þ
which is equivalent to
1 Fl pþr2 
f

l pþr
2
 ¼ uRðrÞ  uRðl pÞ
2u 0RðrÞ
ð10Þ
Next we show that there exists a pair ðl p; rpÞ, rp ¼ 1 l p, satisfying Eq. (10).
Consider the expression
1 Frþ1 r2 
f

rþ1 r
2
 ¼ uRðrÞ  uRð1 rÞ
2u 0RðrÞ
ð11Þ
The left hand side of (11) is always equal to
1 Fð0:5Þ
f ð0:5Þ ¼ k which is a positive
number. Let
FðrÞ1 uRðrÞ  uRð1 rÞ
2u 0RðrÞ
F is a continuous function in the interval ½0:5; 1 with Fð0:5Þ ¼ 0 and
Fð1Þ ¼y. Thus there exists rp b 0:5 such that FðrpÞ ¼ k. Hence we have
shown the existence of rp ¼ 1 l p satisfying the first order condition (10). To
show that rp is a solution to (7) it is enough to prove that there is no r 00 rp
which also satisfies Eq. (10). Suppose not. Let r 0 < rp (a similar argument
works for the opposite case). Then we have
1 Fl pþr 02 
f

l pþr 0
2
 ¼ uRðr 0Þ  uRðl pÞ
2u 0Rðr 0Þ
ð12Þ
1 Fl pþr p2 
f

l pþrp
2
 ¼ uRðrpÞ  uRðl pÞ
2u 0RðrpÞ
ð13Þ
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By Assumption 2 we have
1 Fl pþr 02 
f

l pþr 0
2
 b 1 F

l pþr p
2

f

l pþrp
2
 ð14Þ
Equations (12), (13) and (14) imply that
uRðr 0Þ  uRðl pÞ
u 0Rðr 0Þ
b
uRðrpÞ  uRðl pÞ
u 0RðrpÞ
ð15Þ
But inequality (15) contradicts the fact that uR is concave and strictly increasing
in the interval ½0; 1.
Given that uR and uL are symmetric with respect to the point 0.5 such pair
of policies ðl p; rpÞ is such that l p is the best strategy for party L given that
party R announces rp. Hence we have shown the existence of a symmetric
party equilibrium ðl p; rpÞ.
ii) It only remains to prove uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium. Sup-
pose that there exist r and r 0, r 0 < r, such that ð1 r; rÞ and ð1 r 0; r 0Þ are both
symmetric equilibria. Since any equilibrium policy has to satisfy equation (11)
we have
1 F12
f

1
2
 ¼ uRðrÞ  uRð1 rÞ
2u 0RðrÞ
ð16Þ
1 F12
f

1
2
 ¼ uRðr 0Þ  uRð1 r 0Þ
2u 0Rðr 0Þ
ð17Þ
Equations (16) and (17) imply
uRðrÞ  uRð1 rÞ
2u 0RðrÞ
¼ uRðr
0Þ  uRð1 r 0Þ
2u 0Rðr 0Þ
and this last equality contradicts the fact that uR is concave and strictly in-
creasing in the interval ½0; 1. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2. (sketch) First we show that at equilibrium candidates must
propose the same policy. Suppose this is not the case and let a < b (when-
ever it doesn’t create confusion we omit the subscript). Then it is clear that
policy a 0 such that a < a 0 < b increases the value of the dividing type and so
we have
F
a þ b
2
j I nj
	 

< F
a 0 þ b
2
j I nj
	 

Which is a contradiction. Second we show that a ¼ b0mn; j can not
be an equilibrium. Suppose the contrary and let a > mnj . We have that
PLða; b; I nj Þ ¼ 12. But it is clear that for all a 0, mnj < a 0 < a we have
PLða 0; b; I nj Þ > 12. Hence ða; bÞ can not be a candidate equilibrium. It only
rests to show that a ¼ b ¼ mnj is a candidate equilibrium. This follows easily
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since any individual deviation would reduce the probability of winning to less
than 0.5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3. i) vL is the utility for party L of the lottery that with
probability 1/2 gives policy l p and with probability 1/2 gives policy rp. Recall
that l p ¼ 1 rp so that the expected value of this lottery is 1/2. Now vcLð1Þ is
the utility that L gets under the Candidate Equilibrium when the partition
is P1 ¼ Pp ¼ W. In this equilibrium both candidates announce the same policy
a ¼ b ¼ 12. Since the utility function uL is strictly concave it easily follows
that vL < v
c
Lð1Þ. The same argument works for party R.
ii) We need to show that
vcRðnÞb vcRðnþ 1Þ
Recall that vcRðnÞ is the expected utility for party R when candidates have the
information partition Pn, i.e., v
c
RðnÞ is the expected utility of the ‘‘lottery’’ that
gives mni with probability e
n
i 1
Ð
I n
i
f ðxÞ dx ¼ F ðani Þ  Fðani 1Þ. Thus,
vcRðnÞ ¼
X2 n 1
i¼1
eni uRðmni Þ
Assumption 3 implies that partition Pnþ1 is such that I nþ12i 1W I
nþ1
2i ¼ I ni . Take
an interval I ni J

0; 12

. Note that in this case ani 1 ¼ anþ12i 2 and ani ¼ anþ12i . By
Assumption 1 f is increasing on the interval

0; 12

. Hence F is convex on

0; 12

and F 1 concave on

0; 12

. Then we have that for all m A ½0; 1
mF 1
Fðanþ12i 1Þ þ Fðanþ12i 2Þ
2
	 

þ ð1 mÞF 1 F ða
nþ1
2i Þ þ Fðanþ12i 1Þ
2
	 

aF 1 m
Fðanþ12i 1Þ þ F ðanþ12i 2Þ
2
þ ð1 mÞFða
nþ1
2i Þ þ Fðanþ12i 1Þ
2
	 

ð18Þ
Take m :¼ Fða
nþ1
2i 1
Þ Fðanþ1
2i 2
Þ
Fðanþ1
2i
Þ F ðanþ1
2i 2
Þ. It is always true that m A ½0; 1, then the right hand
side of (18) is equal to
F 1
Fðanþ12i Þ þ Fðanþ12i 1Þ
2
þ m
2
ðF ðanþ12i 2Þ  F ðanþ12i ÞÞ
	 

¼ F 1 F ða
nþ1
2i Þ þ Fðanþ12i 2Þ
2
	 

¼ F 1 F ða
n
i Þ þ Fðani 1Þ
2
	 

¼ mni ð19Þ
Note that
F 1
F ðanþ12i 1Þ þ F ðanþ12i 2Þ
2
	 

¼ mnþ12i 1
F 1
Fðanþ12i Þ þ F ðanþ12i 1Þ
2
	 

¼ mnþ12i
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and
m ¼ e
nþ1
2i 1
eni
Then inequality (18) can be written as
enþ12i 1
eni
mnþ12i 1 þ 1
enþ12i 1
eni
	 

mnþ12i am
n
i ð20Þ
By Assumption 1 f is decreasing on the interval

1
2 ; 1

. Hence, the same argu-
ment as above can be used to show that for any interval I ni J

1
2 ; 1

we have
enþ12i 1
eni
mnþ12i 1 þ 1
enþ12i 1
eni
	 

mnþ12i bm
n
i ð21Þ
It is not di‰cult to see that symmetry of f around 12 and part ii) in Assumption
1 imply that
eni ¼ enoðiÞ
and
mni ¼ 1mnoðiÞ
Thus we can write
vcRðnÞ ¼
Xð1=2Þ2n 1
i¼1
eni ½uRðmni Þ þ uRðmnoðiÞÞ ð22Þ
and
vcRðnþ 1Þ ¼
Xð1=2Þ2 n 1
i¼1
enþ12i 1½uRðmnþ12i 1Þ þ uRðmnþ1oð2i 1ÞÞ
þ enþ12i ½uRðmnþ12i Þ þ uRðmnþ1oð2iÞÞ ð23Þ
To prove that vcRðnÞb vcRðnþ 1Þ is enough to show that each term in Eq. (22)
is greater (or equal) than the corresponding term in Eq. (23), i.e., it is enough
to show that for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; 12 2n 1
eni ½uRðmni Þ þ uRðmnoðiÞÞb enþ12i 1½uRðmnþ12i 1Þ þ uRðmnþ1oð2i 1ÞÞ
þ enþ12i ½uRðmnþ12i Þ þ uRðmnþ1oð2iÞÞ ð24Þ
Since
enþ12i ¼ eni  enþ12i 1
inequality (24) is equivalent to
eni ½uRðmni Þ þ uRðmnoðiÞÞbA
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where
A1 enþ12i 1½uRðmnþ12i 1Þ þ uRðmnþ1oð2i 1ÞÞ
þ ðeni  enþ12i 1Þ½uRðmnþ12i Þ þ uRðmnþ1oð2iÞÞ
Let
B1 eni uR
enþ12i 1
eni
mnþ12i 1 þ
eni  enþ12i 1
eni
mnþ12i
	 

þ eni uR
enþ12i 1
eni
mnþ1oð2i 1Þ þ
eni  enþ12i 1
eni
mnþ1oð2iÞ
	 

Concavity of uR implies
Bb
eni
eni
A ¼ A ð25Þ
The fact that for all j and n we have mnj ¼ 1mnoð jÞ implies that
mni þmnoðiÞ ¼
enþ12i 1
eni
ðmnþ12i 1 þmnþ1oð2i 1ÞÞ
þ e
n
i  enþ12i 1
eni
ðmnþ12i þmnþ1oð2iÞÞ ð26Þ
Hence, concavity of uR, equality (26) and inequalities (20), (21) and (25) imply
eni ½uRðmni Þ þ uRðmnoðiÞÞbBbA
and we conclude that (24) holds. Q.E.D.
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